Privacy has become a major concern in data mining as it is utilized in many important applications. Distributed privacy-preserving data mining (DPPDM) is one of the techniques to address this concern, which focuses on protecting private information of members in distributed systems during data mining. As DPPDM is widely discussed in recent works, the semi-supervised manner of learning still draws less attention in this field. In this paper, a mixture-model-based semi-supervised DPPDM method is proposed. By introducing our method, a site in a distributed system is able to initiate a learning process using labeled data of its own and unlabeled data from all the sites. During the process, no individual data of any site is revealed to others, no information about data can be traced back to any specific site, and only the initiating site learns the result. We propose a parameter-masking privacy-preserving Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm and a mixture-model-based semi-supervised learning algorithm as the two main steps of our method. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, various data mining methods have been developed to extract valuable information from huge amounts of data. As those methods are widely used in industrial, commercial and scientific fields, privacy becomes one of the major concerns in data collecting and mining.
Plenty of works are proposed to address this concern, aiming at describing, analyzing and performing data mining from the aspect of privacy. As an important field of these works, privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) is proposed [1] to address the technique of preserving privacy while performing data mining tasks. Various techniques, such as randomization [1] - [4] , anonymization [5] and encryption [6] - [8] , are utilized to achieve the goal of PPDM regarding different use cases. In most cases, data are distributed across multiple sites, and a distributed PPDM (DPPDM) algorithm is designed to train a model using all the data without any site revealing its sensitive information. In very recent years, various DPPDM The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Rashid Mehmood . approaches are proposed for both supervised [9] - [11] and unsupervised [12] - [14] learning, but there are still limited efforts put on DPPDM with a semi-supervised manner.
Semi-supervised learning (SSL) methods, including co-training [15] , [16] , self-training [17] , [18] , Transductive Support Vector Machines (TSVM) [19] , Expectation-Maximization (EM) [20] , and graph-based methods [21] , [22] , are proposed for improving the performance of learning methods using both labeled and unlabeled data. The applications of SSL have been making significant achievements on areas including but not limited to document classification [23] , [24] , gene functionality analysis [25] , [26] , image analysis [27] , [28] and visual guide robots [29] .
On the contrary to the lack of attention on distributed privacy-preserving SSL, plenty of problems in DPPDM need to be addressed with the art of SSL. A possible situation is that one of the sites P 0 wants to learn a classifier while preserving the information on the task. The phrase the information on a task in this paper refers to two aspects as follows: set. For example, a set of sports news data can be labeled according to the kinds of sports or the languages of the news. The objective of a classifier denotes the specific group of categories introduced to the task.
• The result of learning. The result of learning denotes the models obtained through the learning process. A real-life example is introduced to show the value of this situation. In a distributed system that consists of online retailers, we define a retailer P 0 , which plans to locate the target customers of one of its products. Due to business competitions, P 0 does not want to reveal any information about the product or the target customers. This requires the system to perform a learning task preserving the information on the task which is only known to P 0 , while also constrained by the basic requirements of DPPDM. For similar situations, a semi-supervised manner of mining techniques must be implemented in order to make use of data from other sites to obtain a better model than the one learned only with data held by P 0 .
In this paper, we propose a mixture-model-based label propagation algorithm against malicious adversaries with corruption abilities. Privacy constraints in this paper are mainly focused on individual privacy, which means no individual data value should be disclosed and no information can be traced back to a specific site. In addition, another constraint should be included is that no site except P 0 shall gain the information on the task. To our best knowledge, it is the first to fit the given situation under this particular threat model and privacy constraints. Details on other privacy-preserving semi-supervised learning approaches are given in the next section. Last but not least, our approach does not need any third-party server outside the distributed system.
The basic idea is that the distributed system first performs privacy-preserving unsupervised learning, to obtain a mixture model using data from all the sites. Then P 0 can use its own labeled data through a graph-based algorithm to obtain the labels of each component of the mixture model, and a classifier is given by the mixture model and their labels. To securely compute the mixture model, a new secure-summation-based distributed EM clustering method is introduced, which is modified from existing methods to hide model parameters from sites other than P 0 . To perform semi-supervised learning on the mixture model, we extend the original graph-based method in [30] , [31] to density-wise. Instead of building a graph on data instances, our approach builds a graph on the density of data. It is proved that this approach is equivalent to optimizing an upper bound of the expectation of the original graph-based problem.
The contributions of this paper are concluded as follows:
• A semi-supervised DPPDM method is proposed to learn a classifier using the labeled data of the initiating site and unlabeled data of all sites, while preserving the information on the task and individual privacy.
• A parameter-masking privacy-preserving EM algorithm and a mixture-model-based semi-supervised learning algorithm are proposed to implement the semi-supervised DPPDM.
• Experiments on synthetic and real-world data sets are performed, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II we introduce existing privacy-preserving SSL methods and discuss their suitableness for the proposed situation. Preliminaries about graph-based SSL and privacy-preserving EM clustering are introduced in section III. Our semi-supervised DPPDM method is formally proposed in section IV, and the privacy analysis of it is given in section V. In section VI, we evaluate the effectiveness of our method on both synthetic and real-world data sets. A conclusion of this paper is finally given in section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Up to date, there are only very few works on semi-supervised DPPDM. A semi-supervised framework using generative models was given in [32] , in which a global model is obtained by training with the data generated from a mean model. The calculation of the mean model requires a combiner that learns the data distributions of every site, which may be unacceptable under certain privacy concerns. Introducing an additive homomorphic cryptosystem to the decentralized label prediction algorithm, Arai and Sakuma addressed the problem to securely develop label prediction on a given graph in [33] . Reference [34] proposed a Large Margin Nearest Cluster (LMNC) metric-based semi-supervised privacypreserving clustering algorithm. In this framework, labeled data are held by only one site, named training data provider, which first employs a supervised manner of learning to train the LMNC metrics and share them with other sites. All sites add multiplicative perturbation to the raw data with the LMNC metrics and send them to a cloud server for clustering analysis while preserving privacy. Since the LMNC metrics are shared among the sites in the distributed system, any site learning other's perturbed data is able to obtain the corresponded raw data. Therefore, an independent cloud server outside the sites is necessary. Reference [35] proposed a distributed matrix completion algorithm and used it to perform a distributed semisupervised manifold regularization. During the matrix completion, each site exchanges inter-site data similarities with neighbors through privacy-preserving similarity computation protocols. According to [36] , a distance-recoverable protocol is not secure against malicious adversaries, which makes the method in [35] only suitable against a semi-honest adversary. Reference [37] assumed a scenario where additional nonprivate data are available and provided a learning model to improve the accuracy of a differential-private classifier using both private and non-private data. Reference [38] also proposed a semi-supervised learning method for differential privacy. Like any other method for differential privacy, [37] and [38] focus on private information revealed by learning results and are not suitable for preserving data privacy against malicious collusion.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. GRAPH-BASED SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING AND LABEL PROPAGATION
Zhu et al. [30] formulate the graph-based semi-supervised learning problem based on a Gaussian random field, by analyzing its intimate connections with random walks and spectral graph theory. In [31] , an iterative solution for the problem named Label Propagation is proposed.
The problem of graph-based semi-supervised learning is set up as follows: In a C-classification task, let L = {(x 1 , y 1 ) , (x 2 , y 2 ) , . . . , (x l , y l )} be the labeled data, where y i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ., C}, and U = {x l+1 , x l+2 , . . . , x l+u } be the unlabeled data. A fully-connected graph G = (V, E) is built to represent the data instances and their similarities. V = { ∞ , . . . , \ } is the set of vertices in which v i corresponds to x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n = u + l. e i,j ∈ E is the edge between x i and x j . An n×n weight matrix W is defined, where W i,j represents the similarities between x i and x j . The weight is defined as:
where α is a bandwidth hyperparameter. Assuming similar data instances tend to have the same label, the Label Propagation algorithm lets the label of each node propagate to its neighbors according to their similarities. Let Pr (x) denote the probability of event x, and an n × n probabilistic transition matrix P is defined as:
where P i,j is the probability of labels transiting from node i to j. P is split into labeled and unlabeled sub-matrices:
Let
For the i-th row of Y L , the y i -th element is 1 while others are 0. The Label Propagation algorithm is briefly described as:
It is proven that f U converges to
The algorithm described above can be formalized with a probabilistic frame. Without loss of generality, for binary classification, the energy function is defined as
Under the same assumption that similar data instances tend to have the same label, the nodes with a higher weight should have less different labels. Therefore, the best estimation of f is the one that minimizes the energy function under the constraint f L = Y L . (5) can be rewritten in a form with the graph Laplacian:
where = − W is the graph Laplacian and = diag n j=1 W 1,j , . . . , n j=1 W n,j . It is proved that the solution to the minimization problem is given in the form of f U = − −1 UU UL Y L or f U = (I − P UU ) −1 P UL Y L , which is the same as the convergent result of the Label Propagation algorithm.
In a C-classification task, f i is an 1 × C matrix, where the j-th column of f i denotes the probability of x i being categorized into label j. The index of the largest value in f i is considered as the label of 2 , is a C × C matrix, each diagonal element of which represents a binary energy function of the corresponding category. Since each column of f U is calculated in isolation, each diagonal element of f T f is still minimized by the corresponding column of f U obtained by Label Propagation or (4) . In this case the objective function of the minimization problem can be rewritten as
The basic idea of secure-summation-based privacy-preserving EM clustering is to break each iteration of the EM algorithm for Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) into summations of values that only corresponding to partitions of data [39] . Each value can be computed locally by the owner of the corresponding partition of data. The global results are then computed through a secure summation. The privacy-preserving EM clustering algorithms in existing works have been analyzed and guaranteed to: 1. Not disclose any individual data instance beyond its owner site;
2. Not reveal any information that can be traced back to a specific site.
We assume a distributed system with m sites {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P m−1 } that agree to learn a K -component GMM:
= {π 1 , µ 1 , 1 , . . . , π K , µ K , K } is the set of parameters for the mixture model, where π i , µ i and i are the weight, mean and covariance of the i-th component, respectively.
The set of partitioned data held by site P h is denoted as
During the E-step of the t-th iteration of a secure-summation-based privacy-preserving EM clustering algorithm, each site P h computes
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for every local data instance and mixture component
are the updated parameters for the t-th iteration.
During the M-step of the t-th iteration, each site P h first locally computes the following values:
Then through a secure summation protocol, all sites together compute A
and send the results to P 0 . P 0 updates the parameters by
and broadcasts them to other sites, where n = m−1 h=0 n h is also obtained through the secure summation at the beginning of the algorithm. After receiving µ
All sites compute C
through the secure summation and send the results to P 0 . Then the covariance is updated by
The stopping criterion is determined by
where τ is the predetermined threshold and
is the log-likelihood on the data set in the t-th iteration, which can also be computed through the secure summation. Existing works have different implementations for secure summation. Reference [39] introduces a circular transition protocol for secure summation, which is only secure with an honest-majority. Utilizing additive homomorphic encryption schemes, references [40] - [42] each proposed a cryptographybased secure summation protocol against a malicious majority. In [39] , [40] , [42] a master site is randomly selected to obtain the results of secure summations for A i , B i , C i , D i , n, update the parameters according to (12)(13)(15) and distribute them to all other sites. Reference [41] proposed a protocol where every site initiates a secure summation as a sponsor and receives
In our work, only the site that initiates the learning process, i.e. P 0 , is expecting and allowed to learn the parameters. Therefore P 0 is directly chosen to be the master site or the only sponsor for the secure summation. Since existing securesummation protocols meet our needs, we do not discuss the implementations of them. We simply assume that a securesummation protocol is available, which securely executes multiparty summations against malicious adversaries with corruption abilities and sends the results to P 0 .
C. THREAT MODELS IN DPPDM
In DPPDM, there are mainly two types of adversary models: semi-honest and malicious.
1) SEMI-HONEST ADVERSARY
Also known as the honest-but-curious adversary, it is a passive adversary that follows the DPPDM protocol specification exactly. Sites controlled by the adversary still execute the protocol as specified. The adversary has access to the data of the corrupted sites and the ability to collect all messages received by them. With these abilities, the adversary will try to collect as much private information as possible to violate privacy.
2) MALICIOUS ADVERSARY
This model is stronger and more realistic than the semi-honest adversary model. In this model, an adversary has all the abilities of a semi-honest one and is allowed to not follow the protocol specification. It will build designed inputs or alter messages for the corrupted sites to collect more private information.
IV. MIXTURE-MODEL-BASED GRAPH FOR SEMI-SUPERVISED DPPDM A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In a distributed model, data is distributed across multiple sites. The objective of a Distributed Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (DPPDM) algorithm is described as computing a model using all the data without any site revealing its sensitive information. We only focus on horizontally partitioned data, that is, different sites hold different data instances containing the same attributes.
Let P = {P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P m−1 } be the sites in the distributed system and D = {D 0 , D 1 , . . . , D m−1 } be the set of partitioned data. The data instances belong to the domain of R d , where d is the number of attributes. P 0 holds the data set D 0 = { x 1,0 , y 1 , . . . , x l,0 , y l , x l+1,0 , . . . , x n 0 ,0 } where x 1,0 , y 1 , . . . , x l,0 , y l are the labeled data and x l+1,0 , . . . , x n 0 ,0 are unlabeled. Each label y i is in
The goal for the proposed protocol is to learn a classifier f : R d → [0, 1] C using D against malicious adversaries with corruption abilities under the following constraints: 1. Not disclose any individual data instance beyond its owner site;
2. Not reveal any information that can be traced back to a specific site;
3. No site except P 0 learns the parameters of f .
B. GLOBAL DESCRIPTION
The approach proposed to address the given problem is divided into two parts: 1. P 0 learns a GMM with a special designed privacypreserving EM clustering protocol (given in IV-C) using the data from all sites; 2. P 0 performs a mixture-model-based semi-supervised learning algorithm (given in IV-D) to obtain a classifier using the mixture model and its own labeled data.
In V, it is argued that as long as previous works on privacypreserving EM clustering satisfy the first two constraints, our approach satisfies all the three constraints given above. Fig. 1 shows the process and message exchanges in our method.
C. PRIVACY-PRESERVING EM CLUSTERING WITH PARAMETERS MASKED
In this section, a GMM is denoted as
where
Since only P 0 in our model is allowed to obtain the learning result, it is designated as the master site in the privacypreserving distributed EM algorithm. Instead of directly sending (t) to other sites, P 0 masks the parameters before broadcasting them. Given the masked values, other sites are able to compute z i,j,h of their own without actual parameters revealed to them.
At the beginning of the E-step of iteration t when P 0 holds (t) , the masked values {α
where r are the same for different mixture components in the same iteration. P 0 computes α
i and broadcasts them to all other sites. After receiving α
i , P h computes its conditional expectations as follows:
Then in the t-th iteration of M-step, P h computes A
All sites use secure summation to compute A
and send them to P 0 . P 0 compute µ (t+1) i , π (t+1) i according to (12) (13) . C (t+1) i can be computed locally by P 0 according to
Then P 0 is able to compute (t+1) i according to (15) . To obtain D (t+1) for stopping criterion, P 0 locally computes F (t+1) , G (t+1) and H (t+1) as follows:
D (t+1) is then given by
(29) is proven in Appendix. VOLUME 8, 2020 A global description of this parameter-masking privacypreserving EM clustering algorithm is given in Algorithm 1, which is also shown in Fig. 2 . (20) (21)(22) and sends them to all sites; 11: Each site P h updates z i,j,h according to (23); 12: Set t = t + 1 and repeat 4 to 11.
D. MIXTURE-MODEL-BASED SEMI-SUPERVISED LEARNING
After P 0 learns the mixture model, it performs a mixturemodel-based semi-supervised learning algorithm using only the mixture model and the labeled data of its own. It is focused on a binary classification task without loss of generality. We define a label function f using the same symbol as the soft label matrix in origin Label Propagation, where f (x) denotes the possibilities for x to be in each category. A proximity weight function w is also defined, that w (u, v) = exp{−||u − v|| 2 /α 2 } denotes the proximity weight between u, v.
Under the assumption that the data instances are independently identically distributed, the probability density of the data can be estimated with the given mixture model. Data instances generated from the same component are considered having the same label. Soft labels of the mixture components are defined as g = g T 1 , . . . , g T K T , where g k represents the soft label of a data instance generated by the k-th component. Then the soft label of an instance x is given by
is the conditional probability of an instance being assigned to the k-th component when it is observed in value x. Therefore given g, the classifier f is determined. To obtain g, an expectation of the energy function is defined for a new graph-based optimization problem independent from the unlabeled data. For the sake of convenience, we denote the labeled data of P 0 as L = {(x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x l , y l )} where x j = x j,0 . It is assumed that U = {x l+1 , . . . , x l+u } is a set of u unseen unlabeled random variables. The mathematical expectation for the energy function on X = L U is given by (32) Noting that x l+1 , . . . , x l+u have identical and independent distributions, we rewrite (32) as a summation of three terms as follows:
E (E) is a function of g. Following the objective to minimize E, solutions of the minimization of E (E) should be able to estimate g. Then the estimation of f , as a function of g, is obtained. Noting that the integrals of (33) are difficult for computation, we define an upper bound of (33), named E * , to obtain an approximate solution:
By Jensen's inequality there is E * ≥ E (E). It is noticed that the expression for E * is still complicated for analysis, therefore we represent the labeled data and the mixture components in the same form for a simpler expression of (37) . We represent a mixture component p k as a weighted Gaussian distribution π k u, N µ k , k , where N µ, (x) = N (x; µ, ). That is to assign the u unlabeled random variables to the mixture components according to their weights in the mixture model. A data point z can be represented as a weighted Gaussian distribution 1, N z, I as well, where → 0. Then both the labeled data and the mixture components can be represented in the same form. Let x * 1 , . . . , x * n * , n * = l + K and x * i = m i , N µ * i , * i , be n * weighted Gaussian distributions that are given by
By introducing (19)(40)(41)(42) into (37), we have
and
Noticing that (43) is in the same form as the energy function in (5), we build a new graph G * = (V * , E * ) to represent the similarities between x * 1 , . . . , x * n * . V * = {v * 1 , . . . , v * n } where v * i corresponds to x * i . E * = V * × V * implies a fullyconnected graph where e * i,j ∈ E * denotes the edge between v * i and v * j . Let W * n * ×n * be the weight matrix of G * , where W * i,j = w * x * i , x * j is the weight of e * i,j and the proximity between x * i and x * j . W * i,j is also the expectation of the sum of proximity weights between m i data points generated according to N µ * i , * i and m j points generated according to N µ * j , *
It is reasonable to use W * i,j to represent the proximity between two weighted Gaussian distributions: the expectation being high means points within these two distributions have more chance to be similar which implies that the two distributions are similar. Fig. 3 shows four illustrative examples to give a visual description of w * . In each example, three weighted Gaussian distributions a, b, c are shown where w * (a, c) ≥ w * (a, b) .
In those examples, a black dot denotes a distribution of a single point, an ellipse denotes a Gaussian distribution where the gray dot denotes the mean, crosses denote a possible distribution of points which also implies the weight of each Gaussian distribution, and an equilateral triangle with imaginary lines is given in each example as guides of distances. In Fig. 3a, a, b , c are all single points but the distance between a and c is smaller. In Fig. 3b , the distances are equal, but b is a Gaussian distribution with weight 1. According to Jensen's inequality there is w * (a, c) ≥ w * (a, b) . In Fig. 3c , the covariance matrices of a, b, c are identical and the distances are equal. However, the weight of c is larger, which leads to w * (a, c) ≥ w * (a, b). In Fig. 3d , the covariance matrices are also identical but there is still w * (a, c) ≥ w * (a, b). It is because points distributed in a and c are more probable to have a small distance then points in a and b.
Let * = diag( n * j=1 W * 1,j , . . . , n * j=1 W * n * ,j ) and P * = * −1 W * . Because of the same form, the solution for the minimization of (43) is also given by
An iterative solution is also given as:
Repeat step 1 until f * converges. Knowing the estimation of g, we have a classifier by which the probabilities of the labels of data instances are given as (30) . In a C-classification task, one can choose the index of the largest element in f (x) as the final result of classification.
V. PRIVACY ANALYSIS A. ON THE PARAMETER-MASKING PRIVACY-PRESERVING EM CLUSTERING
The privacy properties of the parameter-masking privacypreserving EM clustering introduced in IV-C are first analyzed individually. Previous works have guaranteed that the secure-summation-based privacy-preserving EM clustering algorithms satisfy the first two constraints given in IV-A. It is argued that Algorithm 1 achieves all the three goals, as long as the statements in previous works are correct.
To formulate the analysis, a formal description of Distributed Privacy-Preserving Learning is introduced. Let L (P, D) = (L 0 , . . . , L m−1 ), L i = (R i , I i ), be a Distributed Learning (DL) algorithm where R i is the designed result for P i and I i is other information learned by P i during the algorithm. In our specific situation, R 0 equals the classification function that P 0 requires, while R i = ∅ for i = 0. A DL algorithm L is considered as a Distributed Privacy-Preserving Learning (DPPL) algorithm when L satisfies certain privacy constraints. These constraints differ according to different privacy models.
Let L (P, D) specifically be the result of privacypreserving EM clustering from previous works introduced in III-B, which stops after T iterations, there are I 0 =
For the parameter-masking privacy-preserving EM clustering, let L (P, D) = R 0 , I 0 , . . . , R m−1 , I m−1 be the result of Algorithm 1. There are R 0 = {µ k , k , π k |1 ≤ k ≤ K } and I 0 = {A
For P j , j = 0, it only receives the masked values, and there is
k , R 0 ∪ I 0 reveals no more information than R 0 ∪ I 0 . For the same reason, R j ∪ I j reveals no more information than R j ∪ I j . Thus Algorithm 1 satisfies the first two privacy constraints as previous works do.
Another goal for our approach is that P j , j = 0, learns no parameter of the model. In other words, R j ∪ I j discloses no value in {µ
To discuss this, we consider each iteration in isolation at first. During each iteration t, the information obtained by site P j , j = 0, is {α
After the random values are eliminated, all equations obtained by P j are:
for every 1 ≤ k, i ≤ K , with the constraint that k is positive definite. Theorem 1: The equations of (47) to (50), with the constraint that k is positive definite for 1 ≤ k ≤ K , have infinitely many available solutions.
Proof: Given a specific 1 ≤ k ≤ K , all other i and µ i can be represented as functions of k and µ k according to (48)(49):
Then the equations can be simplified into
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ K , with the constraint that −1 k + β i − β k is positive definite. There is at least one value for k that satisfies the constraints (the actual value of k in this iteration held by P 0 for example). Given a feasible value for k , represented as * k , and an arbitrary positive
a feasible value for k that satisfied the constraints, namely there are infinitely many feasible values for k . Let
For a feasible k and an arbitrary µ k , there are π k = α k / K i=1 V i α i and π i = V i π k α i /α k together to solve the equations of (53)(54) with the constraint. Since there are infinitely many feasible values for k , there are infinitely many solutions for the equations.
Combinations of multiple iterations disclose no parameter either. The parameters in the (t + 1)-th iteration are functions of the parameters in the t-th iteration and D, which means the functional relationship between parameters of these two iterations can not be determined without knowing D. As stated in the previous discussion,
data in D, therefore parameters in different iterations can be considered as independent variables. Based on this statement, it is argued that multiple iterations of α k , β k and γ k do no better on disclosing the parameters than a single iteration alone.
To sum up: the proposed parameter-masking privacypreserving EM clustering method satisfies all the three constraints given in this paper.
B. GLOBAL PRIVACY
The global privacy of the mixture-model-based semisupervised DPPDM is analyzed in this section. As a combination of the methods in IV-C and IV-D, our approach is argued to hold the privacy properties of Algorithm 1. An intuitive argument is that no additional communication among the sites is committed during the mixture-model-based semi-supervised learning. A formalized discussion is given as follows:
Let L * denote the mixture-model-based semi-supervised DPPDM, and there are R i = R * i and
and there is no more information communicated to P 0 during L * than L . In conclusion, the only difference between the results of L and L * is that R * 0 = R 0 ∪ {g}, where g can be obtained offline by using R 0 and the local data of P 0 . Thus any set of privacy constraints violated by L * is also violated by L . That is to say, L * at least preserves as much privacy as L .
VI. EXPERIMENTS A. SETUP
Experiments are performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the mixture-model-based semi-supervised DPPDM proposed in section IV. To quantitatively evaluate effectiveness, classification accuracy is selected as the measurement. In each experiment, we use a small subset of the data set as the labeled data and the rest of the data set as unlabeled data. After training, we record the classification accuracy on the unlabeled data as the result of the experiment. Since the parameter-masking privacy-preserving EM clustering algorithm in IV-C does not change the results of the EM steps, the learned GMMs are identical to the ones from the original EM algorithm in theory. Therefore the clustering processes are replaced by the original EM algorithm in a non-distributed way during our experiments. Corresponding codes in scikitlearn 1 [44] are directly imported for GMM clustering and the original Label Propagation. Mathematical functions are implemented by numpy 2 and scipy. 3 The experiments are divided into three parts. In the first part, Double-Swiss-roll-shaped data sets in 2 dimensions are generated for synthetic data tests. The second part is for realworld data tests, on the handwritten digits data set provided by UCI Machine Learning Repository 4 [43] . In the third part, we test our method on the Letter Recognition data set 5 [43] and compare it to the original Label Propagation in [31] to further evaluate the effectiveness. Table 1 gives detailed statistics of these data sets. There are two parameters in our method, which is the number of mixture components K and kernel bandwidth α. We vary these two parameters differently according to the data sets.
B. ON SYNTHETIC DATA
A group of double-Swiss-roll-shaped data sets is generated for synthetic data tests mainly to give a visual validation of our method. Each set of data has two arms with a Swiss roll structure as shown in Fig. 4a . Each arm contains 800 unlabeled data points and 1 labeled point. One of the arms is assigned to label ''0'' and the other is assigned to ''1''.
The classification accuracy of the tests is shown in Table 2 . It is observed that the accuracy grows with the number of components in the GMM. In the tests where K is set to be 25, the classification accuracy is around 50%, which is approximate to random guesses between ''0'' and ''1'' for every data point. With K increasing to 50, the accuracy is improved rapidly by 45.77% in the best situation. And the improvement of accuracy is relatively smaller as K meets 80. This is because the GMMs with 25 components are not able to well estimate the distribution of the data. Fig. 4b, 4c and 4d show the components and their labels in the best situations after trained with K = 25, 50 and 80. It can be observed that the GMM with 25 components no longer holds the double-Swiss-roll structure. As for the ones with 50 and 80 components, the structure is held and the accuracy is satisfactory.
C. ON HANDWRITTEN DIGIT IMAGES
Real-world data tests are performed on images of handwritten digits data set provided by UCI Machine Learning Repository [43] . Each data point has 64 attributes and represents an 8×8 image of a handwritten digit. Each attribute is an integer in the range of 0 to 16. Three tasks are in this experiment: the first task is a binary classification for ''1'' and ''0'', on 360 images; the second task is a 5-class classification for digits ranging from ''0'' to ''4'', with 901 images; the last task is a 10-class classification for all digits on 1797 images. Each task consists of 16 groups given by different pairs of (l, K ), where l is the number of labeled data for each category. The value of l varies in {1, 3, 6, 10}. K is in {20, 50, 100, [3, 6, 11] }, the first three of which are also 10 times the numbers of categories in the three tasks. The last value of K differs according to the task, it is always set to be 1 more than the number of categories. Differences between the three tasks are shown in Table 3 . We use 70% of the unlabeled data as training data while the rest is considered as unseen data, but record the accuracy on all the unlabeled data. Each group also runs for 20 rounds. And in this whole experiment, α is fixed to 35. Classification accuracy on Handwritten Digits is shown in Table 4 , 5 and 6. As shown in these tables, the best accuracy of our method on these three tasks is 100.00%, 98.35% and 92.43%, respectively, as a result of the fact that the classification becomes more complicated with more categories. It is still observed that K should be large enough to hold the structure of the original distribution. l also affects accuracy. This is intuitional because more labeled data give more information and better comprehension of the distinctions of categories.
Curves with respect to the variations of l and K are given in Fig. 5 . It shows that accuracy increases and converges with l, and the increases slow down earlier on the binary and 5-class tasks than the 10-class task. Since a similar proportion of K to l +u is chosen on each curve in Fig. 5a , this difference of increase is mainly caused by the difference of the number of categories, which means that on a more complicated task our method takes more labeled data to achieve its best performance. It is observed from Fig. 5b, 5c and 5d that the curves with respect to the variation of K grow rapidly at the first stage because of the increasing estimation accuracy of the data distribution. Meanwhile, the accuracy converges more slowly as the number of categories getting larger. This is because, on a larger data set, K should also be set larger to provide an acceptable estimation on the data distribution.
D. ON LETTER RECOGNITION
The Letter Recognition data set contains 20,000 samples of capital letters in the English alphabet, each of which is represented with 16 primitive numerical attributes denoting statistical moments and edge counts. On this data set, we compare our method to the original Label Propagation (LP) with 1, 5, 10 and 15 labeled data from each category. In this comparison, we set K to 500 and tune α for both methods to its optimal value. The relative tolerance and the maximum number of iteration for LP are set to 0.001 and 500, respectively. Other parameters for LP are left as default in the corresponding class of scikit-learn. In the comparison, we denote our method as MG.
The result of this experiment is shown in Table 7 . It is observed that our method provides better accuracy than Label Propagation in at least 0.36 % with l = 15 and at most 7.33% with l = 1. The better accuracy is achieved because in raw data set there are unusual data observed. These data are less probable to be generated or observed, and contains unusual values in attributes, compared to data with high probabilities in the same category. In LP, these unusual data participate in the algorithm the same as other data and interfere with the propagation. In our method, because of the clustering process, these data are assigned to lower probabilities therefore the influences of them are reduced, which leads to better performance. Fig. 6 shows the accuracy of these two methods with respect to the variation of K , where the accuracy of our method is lower than LP at the first stage but grows rapidly and reaches a higher value. It is also observed that although the rate of growth of our method drops after K = 200, it still gets larger with respect to the growth of K . This means in this range of K , our method does not meet its convergence of accuracy and is still able to provide better performance with a larger K .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel semi-supervised method for distributed privacy-preserving data mining. With our method, a site in a distributed system is able to learn a classifier using labeled data of its own and unlabeled data from all sites under the following privacy constraints:
1. Not disclose any individual data instance beyond its owner site;
3. No site except the initiating site learns the result. The two main steps, briefly privacy-preserving EM clustering and mixture-model-based semi-supervised learning, have been described, respectively. Both privacy analysis and experimental evaluation have been given to show the practicability of our work.
During the global privacy analysis, it is concluded that the privacy properties of our method are decided by the step of the EM clustering. That is to say, by introducing other implementations of privacy-preserving EM clustering, one is able to construct new semi-supervised DPPDM methods to satisfy different privacy constraints. For example, by introducing the EM algorithm in [3] , one is able to perform our method on additively perturbed data. This version of the method suits the sensor network situation better where the sensory devices do not have the abilities for large data storage or complex computing.
The limitation of our work is that under the constraint of the information on the task, only unlabeled data from non-initiating sites are used. Without the constraint, all sites are allowed to obtain the result of the clustering and able to perform a mixture-model based semi-supervised learning using their labeled data together. The problem of privacypreservation in this situation is still open and left for our future work.
